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ABSTRACT 
On-chip debug (OCD) features are frequently available in modern 
microprocessors. Their contribution to shorten the time-to-market 
justifies the industry investment in this area, where a number of 
competing or complementary proposals are available or under 
development, e.g. NEXUS, CJTAG, IJTAG. The controllability 
and observability features provided by OCD infrastructures 
provide a valuable toolbox that can be used well beyond the 
debugging arena, improving the return on investment rate by 
diluting its cost across a wider spectrum of application areas. This 
paper discusses the use of OCD features for validating fault 
tolerant architectures, and in particular the efficiency of various 
fault injection methods provided by enhanced OCD 
infrastructures. The reference data for our comparative study was 
captured on a workbench comprising the 32-bit Freescale MPC-
565 microprocessor, an iSYSTEM IC3000 debugger (iTracePro 
version) and the Winidea 2005 debugging package. All enhanced 
OCD infrastructures were implemented in VHDL and the results 
were obtained by simulation within the same fault injection 
environment. The focus of this paper is on the comparative 
analysis of the experimental results obtained for various OCD 
configurations and debugging scenarios.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.3.3 [Performance and Reliability]: Reliability, Testing, and Fault. 
General Terms 
Performance, Reliability, Standardization, Verification. 
Keywords 
Dependability, Fault Injection, Real Time Systems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem definition 
On-chip debug (OCD) infrastructures are increasingly common, 
particularly in highly complex microprocessors, where prototype 
validation contributes heavily to the total development effort. The 
importance of standard OCD features has long been recognised by 
industry and led to various proposals in this area, namely the 
Nexus 5001™ Forum Standard for a Global Embedded Processor 
Debug Interface [1], the IJTAG P1687 proposal for access to 
embedded test and debug features [2], and the IEEE P1149.7 
Compact JTAG (CJTAG), a test and debug interface proposed by 
the Mobile Industry Processor Interface (MIPI) [3].  
The contribution of OCD infrastructures to shorten the time-to-
-market outweighs their overhead factors (e.g. silicon area, 
additional pins, etc.), even if used solely for debugging purposes. 
Moreover, the controllability and observability features provided 
by common OCD operations enable additional application areas. 
Read / write access to internal registers and memory may be used 
to inject faults and observe their effect upon system operation, 
enabling fault tolerance validation methods that may be used at 
various stages during the product life cycle. OCD infrastructures 
provide a low-cost straightforward solution for fault tolerance 
validation, but face limitations in various areas, e.g. bandwidth 
(fault injection operations per second), coverage (only a subset of 
the microprocessor blocks are within reach of the OCD 
operations), and representativeness (an OCD bit-flip operation 
may be masked by the current instruction as it executes). These 
limitations may be mitigated by enhanced OCD features 
addressing specific fault injection requirements.  
Our comparative study considered three main OCD 
configurations, herein referred as basic, extended and OCD-FI. 
Each level was further subdivided according to specific fault 
injection scenarios, namely off-line / real-time, and 
predefined / on-the-fly determination of the faulty value. The 
OCD-FI scenario was further extended to cope with the presence 
of error detection and correction features, and real-time register 
access requirements. A common set of fault injection campaigns 
and workload applications was used to derive the comparative 
data that grades each OCD scenario. 
1.2 Novelty 
Parts of the R&D work that supported this paper have already 
been published, with an emphasis on design and implementation 
aspects. The basic, extended and OCD-FI configurations were 
described in [4]. The extended scenarios were presented in [5], 
and the bandwidth aspects were discussed in [6]. The novelty of 
this paper consists of presenting, for the first time, a comparative 
analysis of the partial results that correspond to the various OCD 
configurations, accompanied by an overall discussion concerning 
their pros and cons. 
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1.3 Organization 
OCD fault injection in microprocessors is the subject of the next 
section, and comprises the fault injection environment and 
scenarios, and a brief description of the enhanced OCD 
implementations. The core section of this paper then follows, 
presenting the experimental results of our comparative study. 
These results are grouped in three subsections, addressing the 
main OCD configurations (basic, extended and OCD-FI), their 
extensions to cope with the presence of error 
detection / correction features and with real-time access 
requirements, and a summary of performance and overhead 
issues. A final section presents the main conclusions of this work. 
Bibliographical and webliographical references close the paper. 
2 OCD FAULT INJECTION IN 
MICROPROCESSORS 
2.1 The NEXUS fault injection workbench 
Several standardization efforts for OCD infrastructures and 
interfaces were initiated on recent years [2,3,7]. IEEE-ISTO 5001, 
The Nexus 5001 Forum Standard for a Global Embedded 
Processor Debug Interface [1], was the first of these efforts and is 
currently well documented and stable. NEXUS uses an IEEE 
1149.1 compliant port, or alternatively a specific AUX port, 
which can be implemented in different versions depending on the 
desired bandwidth and port size. The communication protocol 
comprises a set of messages that support mandatory, optional and 
developer-defined messages. For maximum flexibility, four 
different classes of compliance are defined in the NEXUS 
proposal. Table 1 presents the debugging features that are 
required for fault injection purposes along with the compliance 
class where they are mandatory. 
 
Table 1. NEXUS: Debugging Features Used for Fault 
Injection (FI) 
Debug Features Class Usability for FI 
Run-Control 1 External Triggering 
Breakpoints 1 Internal Triggering 
Watchpoints 1 Real Time Triggering 
Static Register and 
Memory Access 1 Static Fault Insertion 
Program Trace 2 Fault Effects Classification 
Dynamic Register and 
Memory Access 3 Real Time Fault Insertion 
Data Trace 3 Improved Fault Effects Classification 
 
Experimental results captured using the workbench represented in 
figure 1 constituted the reference data used in our study. This 
fault injection environment comprises an iSYSTEM IC3000 
debugger (iTracePro version) and the Winidea 2005 integrated 
debugging software [8]. Fault injection campaigns were manually 
generated and translated into Winidea scripts. 
Campaign Data refers to the scripts describing the fault injection 
experiments and Trace Data represents the program trace 
information output by the OCD and stored on the debugger for 
subsequent analysis and program flow reconstruction. 
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Figure 1. Fault Injection Environment (MPC565) 
 
2.2 Enhanced OCD infrastructures 
In addition to the workbench represented in figure 1, our 
experimental environment comprised a VHDL model of a 32-bit 
RISC CPU core with stack and interrupt support. This core was 
created with the cpugenerator building tool [9], and coupled to a 
set of enhanced OCD infrastructures that enable the fault injection 
methods compared in this paper. Three applications were used as 
workload: (1) a matrix adder (MAdder), (2) a vector sorter 
(VSorter) and (3) a generic LUT-based control algorithm 
(XControl). Only XControl requires external stimuli generation 
and I/O capabilities on the target. Each application was developed 
in two versions: normal and fault tolerant. Fault tolerance was 
implemented by duplicating data in memory and performing each 
arithmetic operation twice. The comparison of the results obtained 
from each arithmetic operation provides a limited degree of fault 
detection, with some overhead in execution time and memory 
requirements. 
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Figure 2. The OCD Infrastructure 
 
The OCD infrastructure developed is represented in figure 2. It 
was designed to be NEXUS Class 2 compliant, with real time 
memory access capability (sometimes designated as Class 2+ 
compliant), and followed the implementation present in the 
MPC565 microcontroller. The OCD interface uses an AUX port, 
which provides two message data buses (MDI and MDO) for 
OCD data input and output, along with independent clock and 
control signals. Data bus width can be adjusted according to 
bandwidth requirements. Two additional event pins make it 
possible to halt the processor (EVTI) and provide exact timing for 
watchpoint / breakpoint signaling (EVTO).  An additional (RSTI) 
pin is used for resetting the OCD infrastructure. The Bus Snooper 
and Bus Master modules are responsible for interfacing with the 
microprocessor buses. The MQM (Message Queuing and 
Management) module implements the NEXUS message handler 
and the OCD controller. All mandatory messages were 
implemented and also optional messages for internal register 
access and OCD configuration, as allowed by the NEXUS 
proposal. The RWA (Read & Write Access) module is used to 
access both OCD registers and CPU resources (memory and 
registers).  The RCT (Run Control and Trace) module is 
responsible for CPU run control and OCD management. It 
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receives commands from the MQM and RWA modules and 
outputs trace data and watchpoint hit signals. This module 
controls the CPU core clock and the signals required to identify 
branch and exception occurrences on the running application. 
Three ODC configurations were implemented to support this 
comparative study: a lower bandwidth “basic” version (MDI = 2 
bits, MDO = 8 bits); a higher bandwidth “extended” version (MDI 
= 8, MDO = 8); and an “OCD-FI” version that comprises a fault 
injection module. Apart from the setup of fault insertion data 
(triggering and location) and external analysis of the results, the 
autonomous OCD-FI solution enables full control of fault 
activation and insertion, without the need for external signals. The 
implemented OCD configurations are summarized in Table 2, 
which includes the MPC565 information for reference purposes. 
 
Table 2. OCD Configurations used in our comparative study 
OCD  
Configuration 
CLK 
(MHz) 
MDI 
(bits) 
MDO 
(bits) 
FI 
Module 
READI 40 2 8 No 
BASIC 30 2 8 No 
EXTENDED 30 8 8 No 
OCD-FI  30 2 8 Yes 
(READI is the name given by Freescale to the MPC5XX 
NEXUS-compliant OCDs) 
2.3 Fault injection campaigns 
Each fault injection campaign is described by a single script and 
comprises a series of experiments carried out during system 
operation. The target behavior is monitored and information is 
recorded as comprehensively as necessary (and possible), to 
evaluate the effects of the inserted fault(s). The fault model 
consists of bit-flip faults, which are inserted at specific moments 
during program execution, in order to emulate the SEU effects. 
Faults can be injected in all resources accessible by the OCD, 
including memory, internal registers and IO registers. However, 
and since writing in the microprocessor registers is normally not 
possible in real-time, most fault campaigns target memory 
positions. In fact, the NEXUS proposal does not consider real 
time access to registers and common OCD implementations do 
not include it, as it would interfere with program execution. As a 
consequence, the injection of register faults can only be done by 
temporarily halting the microprocessor. Specific fault campaigns 
were executed targeting internal registers to determine for how 
long it was necessary to halt the microprocessor in order to 
evaluate the imposed delay and other negative effects on 
application execution. 
Better performance can be achieved by determining beforehand 
the value that will be present on the target memory cell at the 
fault insertion instant (herein referred as predetermination), but 
this requires: i) Complete knowledge of the program flow up to 
the fault injection instant; ii) Full observability of external inputs; 
and iii) Precise control of the fault injection instant and location. 
If predetermination cannot be guaranteed, it is necessary to read 
the target memory cell data immediately before the fault injection 
instant, in order to determine which faulty value shall be inserted 
to emulate an SEU. Each scenario offers various alternatives for 
this purpose, depending on relevant performance requirements. 
Table 3 presents the experimental scenarios that were used during 
our fault injection experiments. The name of each scenario 
indicates the specific options selected, e. g. (B) basic OCD 
configuration, (E) extended OCD configuration, (OF) offline fault 
injection, (RT) real time fault injection, (+) no faulty value 
predetermination required and (FI) fault injection module present. 
 
Table 3. Fault Injection Scenarios 
Bandwidth Predetermination of the faulty value 
Fault 
injection 
method 
Delays (Clk 
cycles) Scenario
   Set-Up Insertion 
BOF MDI = 2, MDO = 8 YES Offline 22 35 
BOF+ MDI = 2, MDO = 8 NO Offline 22 44 
EOF MDI = 8, MDO = 8 YES Offline 6 9 
EOF+ MDI = 8, MDO = 8 NO Offline 6 18 
BRT MDI = 2, MDO = 8 YES 
Real 
Time 22 35 
BRT+ MDI = 2, MDO = 8 NO 
Real 
Time 22 44 
ERT MDI = 8, MDO = 8 YES 
Real 
Time 6 9 
ERT+ MDI = 8, MDO = 8 NO 
Real 
Time 6 18 
OCD-FI MDI = 2, MDO = 8 YES 
Real 
Time 57 2 
OCD-FI+ MDI = 2, MDO = 8 NO 
Real 
Time 57 4 
 
2.4 EDAC and RTREG OCD extensions 
Our comparative study also included OCD extensions to cope 
with (1) targets equipped with hardware fault tolerance 
mechanisms, and (2) situations where real time fault injection on 
internal registers is critical. To accurately test EDAC-based fault 
tolerance features it must be possible to emulate SEU effects by 
inserting single bit-flip errors into memory without affecting any 
other data or EDAC bits. As OCD infrastructures usually access 
memory through the EDAC mechanism, fault injection as 
envisaged is not possible, since single bit-flip errors are 
automatically corrected. It is therefore necessary to access 
memory directly and to take into account not only the data value, 
but also the extra error detection bits. The extension to the OCD-
FI requires the ability to generate both the data to be written into 
memory and the codes used for error detection and correction. 
The OCD-FI (EDAC) extension is enabled and configured when 
the fault injection experiment is set up, and should be used 
whenever the fault targets EDAC protected memory areas. 
The problem of real time fault injection on internal registers is 
more complex and requires modification of the microprocessor 
register file to allow simultaneous read and write operations. The 
Real Time Register Access (RTREG) extension requires 
additional collision control logic and predetermination of the 
faulty value to be inserted. The collision manager must ensure 
that the fault is injected only when the target register is not being 
accessed for writing, and that the outputs are immediately updated 
if being accessed for reading. This mechanism has additional 
limitations, as it adversely affects the microprocessor dynamic 
performance (i.e. maximum operating frequency), and it is not 
possible to access intensively used registers (i.e. program 
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counter). It can however be useful in situations where real time 
fault injection in internal registers is more important than 
performance issues, and where the coverage limitations are 
acceptable. 
3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
3.1 Basic, extended and OCD-FI scenarios 
All modules were implemented in VHDL and synthesized using 
Xilinx’s ISE version 7. All simulations were run on post place-
-and-route models using Modelsim 6. Synthesis was executed 
identically for all components using balanced area versus 
performance settings. Due to debugger memory limitations, each 
fault injection campaign consisted of 10 experiments, injecting 
one bit-flip fault that emulates a single SEU. One hundred 
campaigns were executed on each scenario using our three target 
applications (MAdder, VSorter, XControl) in their normal and 
fault tolerant versions. Table 4 presents the results of the fault 
injection campaigns, classified by scenario and target application. 
All the scenarios that use offline fault injection (BOF, BOF+, 
EOF, EOF+) returned exactly the same results, which are 
presented on the first line of Table 4 (OFF row). Fault effects 
were classified into the following categories: 
 UERR: Undetected Error – an erroneous final result not 
detected by the (eventual) fault tolerance routine (all errors 
will be UERR if there is no fault tolerance routine) 
 DERR: Detected Error – the fault tolerance routine detected 
an error during execution. The application ended with an error 
detection signal. 
 NERR: No Error – the application ended correctly. This 
result includes both the errors that are still present in memory 
when the experiment ended and those overwritten by the 
running application. 
Fault classification was performed after campaign execution, 
analyzing the contents of the debugger output memory. Trace 
information and the results of each application were compared 
with expected values to identify the occurrence of errors and their 
detection. The execution of all experiments listed above and the 
results obtained led to the following conclusions, relative to the 
controllability and observability of our proposed solutions: 
 All the configurations allow precise control of the memory 
address and bit where the fault is injected. 
 The instant when the fault is injected depends upon the delay 
between the occurrence of the trigger condition and the fault 
insertion instant. As this delay is constant and known for each 
configuration, it is possible to achieve precise control of fault 
insertion. 
 All experiments can be repeated on similar scenarios (i.e. 
using the same target application), on exactly the same 
conditions, and replicated as often as necessary. 
 The fault injection environment and operations have no effect 
on the target application execution before the fault is inserted 
into memory. 
 It is possible to use the trace information generated by the 
OCD to reconstruct program flow. Fault effect classification 
can be executed via the OCD using trace data and memory 
reads.  
 The OCD can be used for subsequent analysis of the final or 
intermediate results, and these tasks may be automated into 
the fault campaign scripts. 
 
Table 4. Fault injection results (in %) 
UERR NERR DERR UERR NERR UERR NERR DERR UERR NERR UERR NERR DERR UERR NERR
OFF 19 81 28 13,9 58,1 98 2 97 2 1
BRT 19,4 80,6 28,3 13,8 57,9 98,1 1,9 96,8 2 1,2
ERT 19,2 80,8 28,1 13,9 58 98 2 96,9 2 1,1
OCD-FI 19 81 28 13,9 58,1 98 2 97 2 1
BRT+ 19,5 80,5 28,4 13,8 57,8 98,2 1,8 96,7 1,9 1,4 29,3 70,7 29,1 1,5 69,4
ERT+ 19,3 80,7 28,2 13,8 58 98,1 1,9 96,8 1,9 1,3 29,6 70,4 28,9 1,2 69,9
OCD-FI+ 19,1 80,9 28,1 13,9 58 98 2 96,9 1,9 1,2 29,8 70,2 28,8 1,1 70,1
Not Possible
MAdder VSorter XControl
SW-FT non-FT SW-FT
Scenario
non-FT SW-FT  non-FT
 
To evaluate the discrepancies between real time fault injection 
scenarios, additional experiments were carried out, and those 
returning different results were replicated using extra debug 
operations, for this specific purpose. Each experiment was 
repeated with added data trace or, if necessary, with breakpoints 
immediately after fault insertion. Although this approach would 
be time-consuming for fault classification, it enables a finer 
analysis of the fault injection methodology.  Erroneous fault 
insertions were classified as Inconclusive (INC), and represent the 
cases where the fault injection process was corrupted due to a 
microprocessor write access to the target cell during fault 
injection. Table 5 presents the percentage of inconclusive results 
found in each scenario. 
 
Table 5. Occurrence of INC results (in %) 
MAdder VSorter XControl MAdder VSorter XControl
OFF
BRT 3,1 0,9 4 2,2
ERT 1,4 0,6 2,3 1,1
OCD-FI 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2
BRT+ 3 1,2 2,1 4,8 2,8 3,2
ERT+ 2 0,8 1,5 3,7 2,1 2,4
OCD-FI+ 0,4 0,2 0,3 1,7 1,2 1,3
Not 
Possible
Scenario non-FT SW-FT
0 0
Not 
Possible
 
(the external I/Os used by XControl prevent predetermination, 
making fault injection campaigns impossible for the indicated 
scenarios) 
The results shown above help us to understand the limitations of 
real time fault injection: 
 The OFF configurations always produce the most reliable 
results, as fault injection is performed when the target system 
is halted. 
 In some cases the CPU overwrites the target memory cell 
before the fault injection operation is complete. This leads to 
an erroneous fault injection and these experiments should be 
discarded (as an inconclusive result) for dependability 
evaluation purposes. Detailed analysis of the INC results 
showed that they mostly represent the injection of multiple 
bit-flips on the same cell.  
 INC results become more probable as the delay between fault 
triggering and fault insertion increases, and as such vary 
within the scenarios and configurations that were considered. 
The use of an OCD-FI configuration and predetermination of 
the faulty value significantly reduces the occurrence of this 
type of results, particularly if used together. 
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3.2 Extensions (EDAC, RTREG) to the 
OCD-FI scenario 
Table 6 presents the results obtained with the OCD-FI (EDAC) 
extension, using only the non-fault-tolerant versions of the target 
applications. The DERR column indicates the percentage of errors 
detected that were corrected by the EDAC mechanism. 
 
Table 6. FI results for a target equipped with EDAC (in %) 
Derr Uerr Nerr INC Derr Uerr Nerr INC
MAdder 39,6 0 58,8 1,6 39,7 0 59,5 0,8
VSorter 98,3 0 0,8 0,9 99 0 0,7 0,3
XControl 29,9 0 69,1 1 30 0 69,5 0,5
no Predet Predet
 
The execution of fault campaigns using the EDAC extension 
provided the following additional conclusions: 
 The OCD-FI (EDAC) extension can be used to automatically 
inject faults into memory blocks protected by hardware fault 
tolerance mechanisms. 
 The use of an EDAC fault tolerance mechanism effectively 
eliminates the effects of single bit-flip errors on the target 
system, since they are all detected and corrected. 
 
Table 7. FI results using the OCD-FI (RTREG) extension      
(in %) 
 non-FT SW-FT 
  Uerr Nerr Derr Uerr Nerr
MAdder 89 11 62 22 16 
VSorter 60 40 46 14 40 
 
The following conclusions are worth of mention: 
 When targeting CPU internal registers in real time, triggering 
must be adjusted to ensure that faults can be inserted before 
the running application attempts to write on the target register.  
 The instructions that can be used as fault triggers depend on 
the target microprocessor, the running application, and the 
target register. Their selection requires precise knowledge of 
the application code and instruction delays. For the 
accumulator register, using our workload applications, an 
average of 45% of the code could be used for triggering. 
 The fault injection results show that faults on the accumulator 
register differ significantly from faults in memory, depending 
on the target application. For instance, the percentage of 
undetected errors was higher for the MAdder application, and 
lower for VSorter (when comparing register and memory 
faults). 
 Similarly, software fault tolerance efficiency is also different 
and is application dependent. 
The use of the RTREG extension shows that the injection of faults 
in internal registers is an important and complex problem. 
Registers are very sensitive to errors, and in critical systems it 
may be necessary to add extra hardware to protect them, and/or to 
more effectively test their sensitivity to faults. In some critical 
systems, adding on-chip support for register fault injection may 
be useful and justify the added intrusiveness and performance 
degradation. 
3.3 Performance and overhead 
Table 8 shows the maximum faults per second rates. The 
configurations considered were only those that do not require 
knowledge of the contents of the target memory cell, since it is no 
longer feasible to predict program flow after the first fault is 
injected. The values indicated assume that each fault is inserted 
separately (no multiple bit-flips on the same memory cell), and 
that the clock frequency is 30 MHz (typical value). 
 
Table 8. Maximum faults / second rates 
Configuration Real Time 
Halted 
Access 
BOF+ 400k 
EOF+ 
Not 
possible 1150k 
BRT+ 454k 400k 
ERT+ 1250k 1150k 
OCD_FI+ 491k 483k 
(real-time fault injection is not possible on 
Offline (OF) scenarios) 
Real-time access provides little performance gain over halted 
access, as this last option was optimized to keep access delays as 
short as possible (access delays are considerably larger when 
using present-day commercial debuggers [10]). Nevertheless, the 
main advantage of real-time access relies on its low temporal 
intrusiveness, and would obviously be necessary on systems or 
applications were real time fault injection is mandatory or highly 
recommended. 
The silicon overhead and the maximum operating frequency 
achieved on a Virtex-2 FPGA are summarized in Table 9. The 
reference scenario (shadowed line) is the case where only the 
CPU core and basic OCD infrastructure are implemented, since 
this is the typical COTS (Components-Off-The-Shelf) situation. 
The figures shown in this table refer to a target CPU that is a 
based on a RISC architecture using a limited instruction set.  The 
use of more complex microprocessors would lower the OCD 
overhead, since the area required is mostly dependent on the 
debug features implemented, and on target bus widths (that should 
remain constant). In comparative terms, the extra overhead 
required for enhanced input bandwidth on the OCD (ERT) is 
fairly large (over 6%). Since the OCD-FI configuration presents 
much better results (less than 0,5%), it is preferable for real time 
fault injection purposes. 
As would be expected, the inclusion of an EDAC mechanism 
slightly increases the microprocessor area, and also reduces its 
maximum operating frequency. The degradation of these 
parameters, imposed by the EDAC and the RTREG versions of 
the OCD-FI infrastructure, are however within acceptable limits, 
considering that they are intended for safety critical applications. 
Table 9. Silicon overhead and dynamic performance 
Area Sobrecarga Max f
Eq Gates % MHz
x 53926 75,4% 37
x x 55018 76,9% 32
x BRT 71527 100,0% 36
x BRT x 72619 101,5% 32
x ERT 76127 106,4% 36
x x 71842 100,4% 36
x +EDAC x 73184 102,3% 32
x +RTREG x 76392 106,8% 27
x +BOTH x x 77484 108,3% 25
RTREGCPU Core OCD OCD-FI EDAC
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4 CONCLUSION 
The results obtained confirmed that our proposed solutions are an 
efficient alternative for injecting faults in memory, both in real 
time and offline scenarios. The best configuration depends on the 
target characteristics and dependability requirements. Offline fault 
injection is preferable for simpler scenarios (i.e. MAdder), and 
real time capabilities may be required for scenarios where 
external I/O must be included in the fault injection process (i.e. 
XControl). 
For the fault model and the real time requirements that were 
considered, the most frequently used fault injection techniques are 
either software or radiation based. A comparison between these 
approaches and our proposed solutions may be made as follows: 
 Our solutions can be used either in simulation, in a 
programmable device (FPGA) or in an integrated circuit 
(ASIC), fitting the technology scenarios that cover the whole 
product development cycle.  
 The use of real-time is not justifiable by performance gains 
and should be used only when required by the target 
application. However, this is a capability where traditional 
fault injection techniques are often lacking and is a major 
advantage of the proposed technique. 
 Most hardware based real-time fault injection methodologies 
would be more complex and expensive to implement, and 
sometimes require a customized hardware version. Some of 
our proposed solutions require modifications to the target 
hardware, but their low overhead facilitates market 
acceptance. 
 Relative to radiation based fault injection or other contactless 
techniques, our proposed solutions have significant 
advantages in terms of experiment controllability and 
replicability. Precise control of fault location and injection 
instant is possible, facilitating experiment replication and 
deterministic results. 
 Software based techniques are more intrusive, present similar 
fault injection delays, and offer more limited coverage. 
 The need to handle erroneous fault classification results is 
common to all fault injection techniques, and more so when 
operating in real time. As in other approaches, problems can 
be minimized using statistical techniques or extra 
classification operations, whenever possible. 
When compared with similar NEXUS-based real time fault 
injection techniques [10], our proposed solutions offer enhanced 
performance, with the subsequent minimization of inconclusive 
experiments. The fault injection campaigns used would not be 
possible on the MPC565 environment, due to the fast execution of 
each target application, when compared with the expected fault 
insertion delays. In fact, there are cases where the target 
applications run in less time than what would be required for the 
entire fault injection process, if using a commercial NEXUS 
debugger. 
Some limitations are still present in our proposed solutions – 
coverage is limited to the resources accessible by the OCD, but 
SEUs may also happen elsewhere. The lack of an accepted 
standard may impose a considerable tuning effort to adapt the 
debugger and the FI module to each particular case, but the trend 
towards OCD standardization will facilitate this effort. Presently, 
NEXUS is the most complete proposal, it is used in commercial 
devices and already provides useful features for fault injection 
purposes. However, it is not an approved IEEE standard and 
different technologies may be adopted in the future [2,3,7]. 
Assuming that watchpoints and data preloading are available, our 
proposed solutions are flexible enough to be adapted to different 
OCD infrastructures, and are adequate to support real-time fault 
injection in current and future OCD-equipped microprocessors. 
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